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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals received this case by transfer from the Utah Supreme 
Court. Jurisdiction is proper in this case under Utah Code section 78A-4-103(2)(j). See 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
CONSTUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following statute and rule are of central importance to this appeal: 
Utah Code Section 78B-6-906. Right of redemption - Sales by parcels -
Of land and water stock, 
(1) Sales of real estate under judgments of foreclosure of mortgages and 
liens are subject to redemption as in case of sales under executions 
generally. 
(2) In all cases where the judgment directs the sale of land, together with 
shares of corporate stock evidencing title Ijo a water right used, intended 
to be used, or suitable for use, on the land, the court shall equitably 
apportion the water stock to the land. If the court divides the land into 
individual parcels for sale, the water stock may also be divided and 
applied to each parcel. The land and water stock in each parcel shall be 
sold together, and for the purpose of the sale shall be regarded as real 
estate and subject to redemption as previously specified. 
(3) In all sales of real estate under foreclosure the court may determine 
the parcels and the order in which the parcels of property shall be sold. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 69C. Redemption of real property after sale. 
(a) Right of redemption. Real property may be redeemed unless the estate 
is less than a leasehold of a two-years5 unexpired term, in which case the 
sale is absolute. 
(b) Who may redeem. Real property subject to redemption may be 
redeemed by the defendant or by a creditor having a lien on the property 
junior to that on which the property was sold or by their successors in 
interest. If the defendant redeems, the effect of the sale is terminated and 
the defendant is restored to the defendant's estate. If the property is 
7 
redeemed by a creditor, any other creditor having a right of redemption may 
redeem. 
(c) How made. To redeem, the redemptioner shall pay the amount required 
to the purchaser and shall serve on the purchaser: 
(c)(1) a certified copy of the judgment or lien under which the redemptioner 
claims the right to redeem; 
(c)(2) an assignment, properly acknowledged if necessary to establish the 
claim; and 
(c)(3) an affidavit showing the amount due on the judgment or lien. 
(d) Time for redemption. The property may be redeemed within 180 days 
after the sale. 
(e) Redemption price. The price to redeem is the sale price plus six 
percent. The price for a subsequent redemption is the redemption price 
plus three percent. If the purchaser or redemptioner files with the county 
recorder notice of the amounts paid for taxes, assessments, insurance, 
maintenance, repair or any lien other than the lien on which the redemption 
was based, the price to redeem includes such amounts plus six percent for 
an initial redemption or three percent for a subsequent redemption. Failure 
to file notice of the amounts with the county recorder waives the right to 
claim such amounts. 
(f) Dispute regarding price. If there is a dispute about the redemption 
price, the redemptioner shall within 20 days of the redemption pay into 
court the amount necessary for redemption less the amount in dispute and 
file and serve upon the purchaser a petition setting forth the items to which 
the redemptioner objects and the grounds for the objection. The petition is 
deemed denied. The court may permit discovery. The court shall conduct 
an evidentiary hearing and enter an order determining the redemption price. 
The redemptioner shall pay to the clerk any additional amount within seven 
days after the court's order. 
(g) Certificate of redemption. The purchaser shall promptly execute and 
deliver to the redemptioner, or the redemptioner to a subsequent 
redemptioner, a certificate of redemption containing: 
(g)(1) a detailed description of the real property; 
(g)(2) the price paid; 
(g)(3) a statement that all right, title, interest of the purchaser in the 
property is conveyed to the redemptioner; and 
(g)(4) if known, whether the sale is subject to redemption. 
8 
The redemptioner or subsequent redemptioner shall file a duplicate of the 
certificate with the county recorder. 
(h) Conveyance. The purchaser or last redemptioner is entitled to a 
conveyance upon the expiration of the time permitted for redemption. 
(i) Rents and profits, request for accounting, extension of time for 
redemption. 
(i)(l) Subject to a superior claim, the purchaser is entitled to the rents of 
the property or the value of the use and occupation of the property from the 
time of sale until redemption. Subject to a superior claim, a redemptioner 
is entitled to the rents of the property or the value of the use and occupation 
of the property from the time of redemption until a subsequent redemption. 
Rents and profits are a credit upon the redemption price. 
(i)(2) Upon written request served on the purchaser before the time for 
redemption expires, the purchaser shall prepare and serve on the requester a 
written and verified account of rents and profits. The period for redemption 
is extended to five days after the accounting is served. If the purchaser fails 
to serve the accounting within 30 days after the request, the redemptioner 
may, within 60 days after the request, bring an action to compel an 
accounting. The period for redemption is extended to 15 days after the 
order of the court. 
(j) Remedies. 
(j)(l) For waste. A purchaser or redemptioner may file a motion 
requesting the court to restrain the commission of waste on the property. 
After the estate has become absolute, the purchaser or redemptioner may 
file an action to recover damages for waste. 
(j)(2) Failure to obtain property. 
(j)(2)(A) A purchaser or redemptioner who fails to obtain the property or 
who is evicted from the property because the judgment against the 
defendant is reversed or discharged may file a motion for judgment against 
the plaintiff for the purchase price plus amounts paid for taxes, 
assessments, insurance, maintenance and repair plus interest. 
(j)(2)(B) A purchaser or redemptioner who fails to obtain the property or 
who is evicted from the property because of an irregularity in the sale or 
because the property is exempt may file a motion for judgment against the 
plaintiff or the defendant for the purchase price plus amounts paid for taxes, 
assessments, insurance, maintenance and repair plus interest If the court 
enters judgment against the plaintiff, the court shall revive the plaintiffs 
judgment against defendant for the amount of the judgment against 
plaintiff. 
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(j)(2)(C) Interest on a judgment in favor of a purchaser or redemptioner is 
governed by Utah code Section 15-1-4. Interest on a revived judgment in 
favor of the plaintiff against the defendant is at the rate of the original 
judgment. The effective date of a revived judgment in favor of plaintiff 
against defendant is the date of the original judgment except as to an 
intervening purchaser in good faith. 
(k) Contribution and reimbursement. A defendant may claim contribution 
or reimbursement from other defendants by filing a motion. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Allen Grazer obtained a judgment against Gordon A. Jones and Richard H. Barney 
related to the construction of a luxury home. As a result of the judgment, on January 17, 
2008, pursuant to a writ of execution from Grazer, the Davis County Sheriff sold all of 
Jones' and Barney's interest in certain real property (approximately 5.25 acres) (the 
"Property") to the highest bidder. Lincoln Hobbs, Grazer's attorney and agent, was the 
highest bidder at the sheriffs sale and purchased the Property with a credit bid of only 
$191.00, although the tax assessed value of the Property exceeded $550,000.00. On July 
7, 2008, Jones and the estate of Barney assigned their right to redeem the Property to the 
Olsen Trust. 
On July 8, 2008, the Olsen Trust attempted to redeem the Property by delivering a 
copy of the assignment to Mr. Hobbs as well as a check payable to Mr. Hobbs as 
Grazer's agent in the amount of $210.00 ($191.00 plus 6% interest accruing from the date 
of the sheriffs sale). Although Mr. Hobbs had been representing Grazer in the case 
continuously since 2002, Mr. Hobbs rejected the tender, returning the documents and the 
check based on the asserted reason that he was not authorized to accept service of the 
redemption materials on Grazer's behalf. 
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Within a day of rejecting the tender, Mr. Hobbs, on behalf of Grazer, prepared and 
recorded a Notice of Amounts Paid and Owed (the "Notice") with the Davis County 
Recorder's Office claiming that Grazer was entitled to receive $2,178.02 for costs 
incurred in conjunction with the sale along with an additional $2,750 for use of the 
Property. Within a day after recording the Notice, Mr. Hobbs then informed the Olsen 
Trust that he was authorized to accept service of the redemption materials but did not 
inform it that he had recorded the Notice. On July 10, 2008, in a good-faith effort to 
remedy any perceived defect with the initial redemption attempt, the Olsen Trust 
delivered to Mr. Hobbs another copy of the assignment and a check made payable to 
Grazer in the amount of $210.00. Four days later, on July 14, 2008, Mr. Hobbs again 
rejected the Olsen Trust's attempt to redeem the Property, this time claiming that the 
redemption amount was inadequate because of the additional amounts listed in the 
Notice. 
In the resulting litigation, Grazer filed a motion for summary judgment seeking to 
establish that the Olsen Trust's redemption attempts were invalid because the Olsen Trust 
did not strictly comply with the redemption requirements of Rule 69C. The Olsen Trust 
filed a cross motion seeking to establish that its redemption attempts were valid and 
effective. Although the parties dispute the legal effect of the facts in this case, the 
underlying material facts are not in dispute. On June 16, 2009, the trial court entered its 
ruling denying Grazer's motion for summary judgment and granting the Olsen Trust's 
motion. The trial court held that under Utah law, the Olsen Trust need only substantially 
comply with the procedural requirements of Rule 69C(c), and that its delivery of the 
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proper amount within the redemption period to Grazer's agent and attorney, along with a 
copy of the pertinent assignment, substantially complied with those requirements. Grazer 
now appeals that ruling, seeking to overturn the trial court's determination that the Olsen 
Trust's redemption efforts were valid and effective. In so doing, Grazer is attempting to 
gain a windfall by obtaining a large and valuable piece of property for a mere $191.00, 
while reducing his judgment against Jones by only that meager amount. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Lincoln Hobbs has continually represented Allen Grazer in the pre-
judgment and post-judgment proceedings in the above-captioned case from 2002 to the 
present time. (R. 6478, 6785.) 
2. On January 17, 2008, pursuant to a writ of execution dated November 8, 
2007, the Davis County Sheriff sold all of Gordon A. Jones' and the estate of Richard H. 
Barney's interest in certain real property (approximately 5.25 acres) located in Davis 
County, Utah (the "Property"), to the highest bidder. (R. 6478-79, 6785.) 
3. Acting on behalf of Grazer, Mr. Hobbs was the highest bidder at the 
sheriffs sale and purchased the Property with a credit bid of $191.00. (R. 6479, 6785.) 
4. At the time Mr. Hobbs purchased the Property on behalf of Grazer for 
$191.00, the Property had a tax-assessed value of over $550,000. (R. 6336, 6379-85.) 
5. On July 1, 2008, Mr. Hobbs, continuing to represent Grazer, filed a motion 
to compel discovery from Cheryl Gudmundson, another party in the underlying lawsuit. 
(R. 6250.) 
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6. On July 7, 2008, Jones/Barney executed an Assignment of Redemption 
Rights (the "Assignment"), assigning their rights to redeem the Property to the Olsen 
Trust. (R. 6496-500.) 
7. On July 8, 2008, within the 180-day redemption period set forth in Rule 
69C(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Olsen Trust attempted to redeem the 
Property by delivering to Grazer's counsel: (1) a copy of the Assignment; (2) a check 
made payable to Grazer's counsel in the amount of $210.00, purporting to cover the 
$191.00 purchase price plus six percent (6%) annual interest accruing from the date of 
the sheriffs sale; and (3) a certificate of redemption. The Olsen Trust requested that 
Grazer sign and acknowledge the certificate of redemption and return the executed 
certificate no later than July 11, 2008. (R. 6479, 6786, 6491-504.) 
8. Subsequently, on July 8, 2008, Grazer's counsel, Mr. Hobbs, returned the 
documents and the check to the Olsen Trust rejecting its tender. By letter of same date, 
Grazer's counsel informed the Olsen trust that his reason for rejecting the tender of the 
documents and check was that he was not authorized to accept service of the redemption 
materials on Grazer's behalf and that the check was made payable to him, rather than 
Grazer. (R. 6931, 6479-80, 6786-87.) 
9. On July 9, 2008, Mr. Hobbs, on behalf of Grazer, recorded a Notice of 
Amounts Paid and Owed with the Davis County Recorder's Office, Utah, in which 
Grazer claimed that he had incurred and paid $2,178.02 in conjunction with the sale 
along with an additional $2,750.00, due to the use of the Property after the date of the 
sheriffs sale. (R. 6480, 6787, 6463.) 
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10. In a good-faith effort to remedy any perceived defect with its redemption 
efforts, on July 10, 2008, again within the 180-day redemption period, the Olsen Trust 
attempted to redeem the property for a second time. The Olsen Trust, after being 
informed that Grazer's counsel now had authorization to accept service of the redemption 
materials, delivered a copy of the Assignment, a check made payable to Grazer in the 
amount of $210.00, and a certificate of redemption. (R. 6932, 6480, 6787-88.) 
11. On July 14, 2008, Mr. Hobbs again rejected the Olson Trust's second 
attempt to redeem the Property and, for the first time, indicated that he did not believe the 
$210.00 redemption amount was adequate. (R. 6932, 6480, 6788.) 
12. Upon subsequently discovering that Mr. Hobbs had recorded the Notice, 
and recognizing a dispute in the amount claimed by Grazer, counsel for Jones and the 
Olsen Trust submitted a Request for Accounting of Rents and Profits to Grazer on July 
15, 2008, asking Grazer for a written and verified account of rents and profits with 
respect to the Property during the redemption period, and a Petition for Establishment of 
Redemption Price on August 15, 2008. (R. 6480-81, 6788-89.) 
13. On September 3, 2008, Grazer filed a Motion to Strike Petition for 
Establishment of Redemption Price, claiming that the Olsen Trust's Petition for 
Establishment of Redemption Price was untimely filed, which the Court granted on 
December 12, 2008. (R. 6316, 6438, 6932.) 
14. On January 9, 2009, Grazer filed a motion for partial summary judgment 
regarding the validity of the attempted redemptions, and on February 9, 2009, the Olsen 
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Trust filed a cross motion for partial summary judgment on the same issue. (R. 6466, 
6507.) 
15. On June 16, 2009, the trial court entered its ruling denying Grazer's motion 
for partial summary judgment and granting the Olsen Trust's cross motion, confirming 
the validity of the attempted redemption of the Property. (R. 6927, 6971.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
At issue is whether the Olsen Trust's redemption attempts were valid and 
effective. The trial court properly determined that they were. In his brief, Grazer has 
asserted that strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 69C is required under Utah 
law, but he fails to distinguish between the procedural components of Rule 69C and the 
substantive components of the same, citing in support of his strict compliance argument 
cases dealing with the substantive redemption requirements of timing and amount. 
Grazer's argument misses the mark because it is undisputed that the Olsen Trust 
attempted to redeem the property by delivering the proper amount within the time period 
required, and the only issue is whether the Olsen Trust complied with the procedural 
requirements of Rule 69C(c) when it timely delivered the proper amount. It is well-
settled under Utah law that substantial compliance with the procedural requirements of 
Rule 69C(c) is sufficient for effective redemption. The trial court properly held that the 
Olsen Trust's delivery of the assignment to Grazer's attorney and agent, along with a 
check in the proper amount made payable to the same, all within the redemption period, 
constituted substantial compliance with the requirements of Rule 69C(c). 
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First, it is undisputed that at the time of the redemption attempt on July 8, 2008, 
the proper redemption amount was $210.00 ($191.00 plus 6% interest from the date of 
the sale). Mr. Hobbs' rejection of the redemption attempt based on the assertion that he 
was not authorized to accept delivery of the same and Mr. Hobbs' subsequent recordation 
of the Notice were improper and ineffective in increasing the redemption amount. To the 
extent additional amounts were actually incurred by Grazer, such amounts were waived 
under Rule 69C(e) due to Grazer's failure to record a notice of the same prior to 
redemption. Consequently, the trial court correctly determined that the Olsen Trust's 
tender of the proper amount to Grazer's agent constituted delivery to Grazer. 
Second, Grazer's challenge of the redemption amount based on the Olsen Trust's 
failure to deliver a certified copy of Grazer's own judgment, as well as an affidavit 
showing the amount Grazer was due under his own judgment, seeks to elevate form over 
substance. Such requirements are clearly intended to apply to junior lien holders and 
therefore the trial court properly determined that the Olsen Trust substantially complied 
with Rule 69C(c). 
Finally, the trial court properly determined that the equities in the case supported 
its finding that the Olsen Trust's redemption efforts were effective. (R. 6941.) Under 
Utah law, courts can properly consider the equities of the case in addressing issues of 
redemption. In fact, Utah law provides that a court may even extend the redemption 
period where the property was sold for a grossly inadequate price and there were 
irregularities in the conduct of the party benefited by the sale. In the instant case, the trial 
court found that Grazer would receive a windfall if he prevailed on his technical 
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arguments concerning the Olsen Trust's redemption attempts. Grazer paid only $191.00 
for approximately 5.25 acres of property that had a tax-asse|ssed value of over $550,000. 
In short, the price paid by Grazer was grossly inadequate, the very purpose of the 
redemption remedy is to discourage such low-balling. In addition, there were 
irregularities in the conduct of Grazer and/or his agent prior to the expiration of the 
redemption period. Namely, Grazer's attorney, who had b^en acting as Grazer's agent 
since 2002 in all matters relating to the Property (including its purchase), rejected the 
Olsen Trust's redemption attempt only quickly to file a Noiice of Amounts Paid and 
Owed seeking to increase the redemption amount. After filing the Notice, Mr. Hobbs 
then notified the Olsen Trust that he was authorized to accept service, but did not disclose 
the fact that he had just filed the Notice seeking to increase the redemption price. Such 
conduct in conjunction with the grossly inadequate price p^id by Grazer through his 
agent provided additional support for the trial court's ruling. 
In short, the trial court properly ruled that the Olseni Trust had substantially 
complied with the redemption requirements and its redemption attempt was effective. 
This ruling is consistent with settled Utah law that where a| debtor, acting in good faith, 
has substantially complied with the procedural requirements of the rule in such a manner 
that the purchasing party is not injured or adversely affected, and is getting what he is 
entitled to, the law will not aid in depriving the mortgagor I of his property for merely 
falling short of exact compliance with technicalities. 
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ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly held that the Olsen Trust's July 8 redemption attempt 
substantially complied with the redemption requirements and was, therefore, effective. In 
his brief, Grazer asserts that the timing and amount of a redemption payment are 
substantive rights that demand strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 69C. 
Grazer's argument misses the mark, however, because the real issue is not the timing or 
the amount of the redemption payment made by the Olsen Trust. The undisputed facts 
demonstrate that the Olsen Trust delivered the proper amount within the redemption 
period to Grazer's agent and attorney, Mr. Hobbs. Therefore, the real issue on appeal is 
whether the Olsen Trust substantially complied with the procedural redemption 
requirements when it made its redemption attempt. As demonstrated below, the trial 
court properly ruled that it did. 
J. The Olsen Trust's July 8, 2008 Redemption Attempt Complied, or at a 
Minimum, Substantially Complied with the Rule 69C Redemption 
Requirements. 
Rule 69C states in relevant part: 
(b) Who may redeem. Real property subject to redemption may be 
redeemed by the defendant... or by their successors in interest.[*] . . . 
(c) How made. To redeem, the redemptioner shall pay the amount required 
to the purchaser and shall serve on the purchaser: 
(c)(1) a certified copy of the judgment or lien under which the 
redemptioner claims the right to redeem; 
(c)(2) an assignment, properly acknowledged if necessary to establish 
the claim; and 
(c)(3) an affidavit showing the amount due on the judgment or lien. 
1
 "'Successors in interest' clearly includes assignees." Tech-Fluid Servs., Inc. v. Gavilan 
Operating Inc., 787 P.2d 1328, 1331 n.3 (Utah App. 1990). 
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(d) Time for redemption. The property may be redefemed within 180 days 
after the sale. 
(e) Redemption price. The price to redeem is the sale price plus six 
percent. . . . If the purchaser or redemptioner files with the county recorder 
notice of the amounts paid for taxes, assessments, insurance, maintenance, 
repair or any lien other than the lien on which the redemption was based, 
the price to redeem includes such amounts plus six percent for an initial 
redemption or three percent for a subsequent redemption. Failure to file 
notice of the amounts with the county recorder waives the right to claim 
such amounts. 
(g) Certificate of redemption. The purchaser shall promptly execute and 
deliver to the redemptioner . . . a certificate of redemption . . . . 
(h) Conveyance. The purchaser or last redemptioner is entitled to a 
conveyance upon the expiration of the time permitted for redemption. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 69C(b)-(h). 
A close review of the facts at issue in this case reveals that while the parties may 
dispute the legal effect given to the facts, the underlying events, or material facts, are not 
disputed. Thus, the trial court did not err when it entered summary judgment. There is 
no dispute that the Olsen Trust timely served on Grazer's counsel the appropriate 
documents and a check payable to his counsel for the sales] price plus six percent. Indeed, 
on July 8, 2008 (within the 180-day redemption period), the Olsen Trust delivered a copy 
of the assignment whereby Jones/Barney had assigned the redemption right to the Olsen 
Trust along with a $210.00 check and requested that Grazer execute and return a 
Certificate of Redemption as required under Rule 69C(g). Furthermore, there is no 
dispute that on July 8, 2008, the proper redemption price was $210.00, because, as of July 
8, 2008, Grazer had not filed with the Davis County Recorder notice of any additional 
costs (as required by Rule 69C(e)). 
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The only issue before the trial court on summary judgment was whether delivering 
the redemption documents and check to Grazer's counsel complied, or substantially 
complied, with Rule 69C(c). The trial court properly ruled that it did. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that: 
rules and statutes dealing with redemption are regarded as remedial in 
character and should be given liberal construction and application to permit 
a property owner who can pay his debts to do so, and thus make his creditor 
whole, and save his property. Therefore, if a debtor, acting in good faith, 
has substantially complied with the procedural requirements of the rule in 
such a manner that the lender mortgagee is not injured or adversely 
affected, and is getting what he is entitled to, the law will not aid in 
depriving the mortgagor of his property for mere falling short of exact 
compliance with technicalities. 
United States v. Loosley, 551 P.2d 506, 508 (Utah 1976) (emphasis added) (quoted in and 
relied upon by Tech-Fluid Services, Inc. v. Gavilan Op. Inc., 787 P.2d 1328, 1331 n.3 
(UtahCtApp. 1990)). 
In his brief, Grazer asserts that "[s]ince 1991, Utah case law has emphasized that 
substantive rights of a purchaser in the redemption process require strict compliance with 
the rules." [Appellant Brief at 37.] Presumably, Grazer selects this cutoff date in order 
to exclude the relevant cases of Loos ley and Tech Fluid Services, under which the courts 
held "that substantial compliance is the proper test under Rule 69(f)(2) [the substantive 
predecessor to Rule 69C(c)]." In fact, even the post-1991 cases cited by Grazer reaffirm 
that substantial compliance with the provisions of 69C(c) is sufficient. For example in 
Springer v. Springer, 853 P.2d 888, 891 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme Court stated that 
"[t]his court has allowed substantial compliance with the requirements of rule 69(f)(2) 
[predecessor to Rule 69C(c)], which prescribes the process by which redemption is made, 
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United States v. Loosley, 551 P.2d 506, 508 (Utah 1976), bijt not with rule 69(f)(3) 
[predecessor to Rule 69(d) and (e)]." Similarly, in Huston t Lewis, 818 P.2d 531, 535 
n.13 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme Court cited Loosley in |favor of the proposition that 
"not all redemption procedures can be characterized as substantive in all circumstances," 
and "[i]n dealing with procedures that do not affect substantive rights, substantial 
compliance is generally sufficient." 
In the instant case, because it is undisputed that the Olsen Trust tendered the 
proper amount to Grazer's agent, Mr. Hobbs, within the time period required by Rule 
69C, and that the Olsen Trust otherwise substantially complied with the requirements of 
Rule 69C(c), the trial court was correct in determining that the Olsen Trust's efforts to 
redeem the Property were valid and effective. 
A. The Rejection by Mr. Hobbs of the Olsen Trust's Notice of Redemption 
and Tendered Check and the Subsequent Recording of the Notice of 
Amounts Paid and Owed Was Improper and Should Not Be Effective. 
General agency principles allow an agent to act for a principal where the agent has 
actual or apparent authority to do so. See, e.g., Luddington v. Bodenvest Ltd., 855 P.2d 
204, 208 (Utah 1993) (stating that apparent authority exists where conduct of the 
principal, "'reasonably interpreted, causes the third person to believe that the principal 
consents to have the act done on his behalf by the person purporting to act for him'" 
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 27)). Here, it is difficult to understand 
how Grazer can claim that by sending the redemption notice and check to Grazer's 
counsel the Olsen Trust did not comply with Rule 69C. It is also difficult to comprehend 
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how Mr. Hobbs can claim he did not have authority to accept the papers and check. The 
case history demonstrates that Grazer authorized Mr. Hobbs to act on his behalf in the 
lawsuit, including post-judgment matters. 
Mr. Hobbs represented Grazer and acted as his agent throughout this case. Mr. 
Hobbs obtained the initial judgment against Jones. Mr. Hobbs obtained a writ of 
execution to have Jones' property sold. Mr. Hobbs attended the execution sale of the 
Property. Mr. Hobbs bid on the Property. Mr. Hobbs purchased the property on behalf 
of Grazer. Mr. Hobbs continued to represent Grazer in efforts to collect on Grazer's 
judgment by filing a motion to compel as late as July 1, 2008. Yet, when the Olsen Trust 
attempted to exercise its statutory right, as properly assigned to it by Jones, by notifying 
Grazer through his attorney of record on July 8, 2008 of the redemption, providing proof 
of the assignment, and tendering a check for the proper amount, Mr. Hobbs claimed that 
he did not have authority to accept service on behalf of his client. 
Even more troubling, after refusing to accept service—because he claimed not to 
have authority from his client to do so—Mr. Hobbs immediately went to the Davis 
County Recorder's Office on July 9, 2008, on behalf of his client, and recorded the 
Notice. Then, without notifying the Olsen Trust or Jones of the Notice, Mr. Hobbs 
simply told the Olsen Trust that he could now accept service for Grazer of the Olsen 
Trust's redemption papers. And, in a final blow, Mr. Hobbs subsequently claimed that 
the amount he received from the Olsen Trust on July 10, 2008 was ineffective because it 
did not reflect the amount in the Notice of Amounts Paid and Owed, which he first 
recorded on July 9, 2008. 
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The facts in Loosley are remarkably similar to those in the instant case. There, 
after having his property sold at a foreclosure sale, Loosley assigned his rights to another 
party who exercised Loosley's redemption rights by delivering a check to the purchaser's 
attorney. See id. at 507. The purchaser's attorney returned the check claiming that all of 
the necessary documents were not included and the check sfiould have been delivered to 
the purchaser himself. See id. The court found that the purbhaser's reasons for rejecting 
the attempted redemption were excuses to justify a preconceived desire to refuse to 
accept the tender and release the mortgage and that the purchaser was not justified in 
refusing to accept the tendered payment and was obligated to release the mortgage. See 
id. at 508. Similarly, the trial court in the instant case properly determined that the Olsen 
Trust substantially complied with Rule 69C and its redemption efforts were effective. 
B. Grazer Waived Any Claim for Additional Redemption Amounts Beyond 
What the Olsen Trust Originally Tendered. 
Because the Olsen Trust's July 8, 2008 redemption efforts at least substantially 
complied with Rule 69C, the trial court properly concluded that Grazer's recording of the 
I 
Notice was untimely and had no effect on the redemption amount. Rule 69C(e) makes 
clear that "[fjailure to file notice of [such] amounts with the county recorder waives the 
right to claim such amounts." Utah R. Civ. P. 69C(e). WHen the Olsen Trust tendered a 
check for the sale price plus 6% and submitted the documents required by Rule 69C(c) to 
Grazer's counsel on July 8, 2008, Grazer had not given notice of any additional amounts 
paid and owed. Only after the Olsen Trust redeemed the Property did Grazer file its 
Notice. By waiting until after the Olsen Trust redeemed the Property to file the Notice, 
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Grazer waived his right to claim such amounts. Therefore, Grazer has no legal basis for 
disputing the redemption price. Any other result would completely nullify the effect of 
the language contained in Rule 69C(e), which clearly provides for waiver of claims for 
additional amounts if proper notice is not recorded prior to redemption. 
C. The Olsen Trust Substantially Complied with Rule 69C Despite Its Failure 
to Provide Documents and Information Already in Grazer's Possession. 
Grazer also attempts to attack the Olsen Trust's redemption efforts by claiming he 
did not receive all of the required documentation. Grazer asserts that because the Olsen 
Trust failed to provide a certified copy of his own judgment as well as an affidavit 
showing the amount due Grazer on his own judgment, the Olsen Trust failed to 
substantially comply with the requirements of Rule 69C(c). The trial court correctly 
rejected this argument. 
Rule 69C provides in relevant part as follows: 
(c) How made. To redeem, the redemptioner shall pay the amount required 
to the purchaser and shall serve on the purchaser: 
(c)(1) a certified copy of the judgment or lien under which the 
redemptioner claims the right to redeem; 
(c)(2) an assignment, properly acknowledged if necessary to establish 
the claim; and 
(c)(3) an affidavit showing the amount due on the judgment or lien. 
However, a careful review of Rule 69C(b) demonstrates that Rule 69C sets forth 
requirements for redemption by either a defendant (and its assignee) or by a junior lien 
holder.2 The requirements that Grazer claims were not met (providing a copy of the 
2
 Rule 69C(b) provides: "Who may redeem. Real property subject to redemption may be 
redeemed by the defendant or by a creditor having a lien on the property junior to that on 
which the property was sold or by their successors in interest. If the defendant redeems, 
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judgment and an affidavit of the amount owing on the lien) clearly apply to a junior lien 
holder and not to the defendant. It would be illogical for the Olsen Trust to have 
provided Grazer with a copy of Grazer's own judgment or to have secured an affidavit 
showing the amount Grazer claimed he was owed on his own judgment. At the time of 
the July 8 redemption, Grazer had already executed on several pieces of real property 
pursuant to his judgment, making Grazer the only one who teally knew how much he was 
owed under his judgment. The only requirement necessary for the assignee of the 
defendant is to provide service of a properly-acknowledged assignment. There is no 
dispute that such a document was provided to Grazer's agerit on July 8, 2008, in good 
faith compliance with 69C(c). Moreover, even if Rule 69C(c) required the Olsen Trust to 
provide such documents, its failure to do so would not have affected a substantive right or 
caused any prejudice to Grazer, especially in light of the fabt that he already possessed 
the information. To allow Grazer to invalidate the redemption effort based on the Olsen 
Trust's failure to provide these documents would truly elevate form over substance. 
In sum, the Olsen Trust's efforts warrant a "liberal construction" of the 
redemption rule under Loosley because: (1) Jones/Barney and the Olsen Trust acted in 
good faith; (2) the Olsen Trust complied, or substantially complied, with the procedural 
requirements of Rule 69C; (3) Grazer has not cited and cannot demonstrate any injury or 
adverse effect that he would sustain if his attorney accepted service of the July 8, 2008 
materials; and (4) Grazer is receiving the redemption price to which he is entitled under 
the effect of the sale is terminated and the defendant is restored to the defendant's estate. 
If the property is redeemed by a creditor, any other creditor having a right of redemption 
may redeem." 
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the Rule. Therefore, the Olsen Trust has "substantially complied with the procedural 
requirements of the rule [Rule 69C]" so that the Olsen Trust should not be deprived of its 
property "for mere falling short of exact compliance with technicalities." loosley, 551 
P.2d at 508. 
II. The Trial Court Properly Found that the Equities of the Case Further 
Supported Its Ruling. 
In the proceedings below, the trial court found additional support for its ruling in 
the equities of the case, particularly the fact that Grazer would obtain a large and 
unjustified windfall if the Olsen Trust's good faith efforts to redeem the Property were 
rejected on the basis of a technicality. Utah courts have long considered equity when 
evaluating redemption of property. 
For example, "[i]t is long established in Utah law that ca court, sitting in equity, 
may in appropriate instances extend the [redemption] period.'" Pyper v. Bond, 2009 UT 
App 331, t 10, 224 P.3d 713 (quoting Mollerup v. Storage Sys. InVl, 569 P.2d 1122, 
1124 (Utah 1977)). In Pyper, a case upon which Grazer heavily relies in his brief, the 
Utah Court of Appeals applied the two-part test set forth in the seminal case Young v. 
Schroeder, 37 P. 252 (Utah 1894), in order to determine that the extension of a 
redemptive period was proper: (1) gross inadequacy of price; and (2) irregularities 
attending the sale. Pyper, 2009 UT App 331 at [^ 11. The Pyper court held that the 
"irregularities" required for the second element of the Young test, were not limited to 
irregularities in the sale itself, but could also relate to "the purchasers' conduct after the 
sale. In particular, prior to the expiration of the redemption period." Id. at f^ 14. 
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In the instant case, both elements of the Young test se^ ; forth in Pyper are easily 
met, justifying an equitable extension of the redemption period.3 First, Grazer purchased 
the Property through his agent for a grossly inadequate price - Grazer paid a mere 
$191.00 for approximately 5.25 acres. Significantly, in Pyper, the court found that "the 
sale of the Pyper's $75,000 of equity in the property for $329 both 'shocks the conscience 
of an impartial mind' and was '[such a] sacrifice of [Pyper's] property . . . that an honest 
man would hesitate to take advantage of it."5 Id. at f^ 12 n.5 (citations omitted). The 
gross inadequacy of price is even more egregious in this ca^e. Grazer purchased the 
Property at the sheriffs sale for a ridiculously low amount of $191.00, when the tax-
assessed value of the Property was over $550,000.00. If the trial court had allowed 
Grazer to block the redemption of the Property, only $191.(1)0 would have been credited 
against the Jones/Barney judgment, and Grazer would have received an enormous 
windfall. This would have defeated the very purpose of the redemption remedy, which is 
to "provide a check on bids that are well below market value." Brockbank v. Brockbank, 
32 P.3d 990, 993 (Utah App. 2001) (citing with approval an Illinois appellate court case 
holding that the purpose of that state's redemption statute "was ... to secure for the 
debtor the highest price possible for his property and the satisfaction of as many of his 
3
 Although, in considering the equities below, the trial court did not expressly rely 
on the doctrine of equitable extension, u[i]t is well settled that an appellate court may 
affirm the judgment appealed from 'if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory 
apparent on the record." Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ^  10, 52 P.3d 1158. This is true 
"even though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the 
basis of its ruling or action." Id. 
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debts as possible and "to compel creditors to bid a fair and adequate price for the debtor's 
property, and to prevent them from bidding a small sum"). 
The second element of the test set forth by the Pyper court is also met in the 
instant case; namely, the presence of irregularities in the conduct of Grazer and his agent 
prior to the expiration of the redemption period. Because of the extreme inadequacy of 
the price paid by Grazer, the Olsen Trust need only show "slight circumstances of 
unfairness in the conduct of the party benefited by the sale to raise the presumption of 
fraud." Pyper, 2009 UT App 331, \ 17 (quoting Pender v. Dowse, 265 P.2d 644, 648 
(Utah 1954)). The refusal by Grazer's agent to accept tender of the proper redemption 
amount under the assertion that he was not authorized to accept service of such items, 
only to immediately record a notice of additional costs without informing the Olsen Trust 
and then notify the Olsen Trust the following day that he was authorized to accept service 
certainly constitutes, at the very least, "slight circumstances of unfairness in the conduct 
of the party benefited by the sale." In light of the gross inadequacy of price, such 
circumstances are sufficient to meet the second element of the test set forth in Pyper. 
Accordingly, the equities of the case also militate in favor of the trial court's 
ruling. To the extent Grazer is prevented from gaining the six-figure windfall he hoped 
to gain by bidding a ridiculously low amount for the Property at the Sheriffs Sale, Grazer 
brought this predicament upon himself when he voluntarily decided to buy the Property 
at a fraction of its actual worth. See id at 993 n.3 (recognizing that "[t]he judgment 
creditor always has it in his power to make the land sold under execution of his judgment 
bring its real value, so that, if a redemption is effected, he cannot be hurt"). Thus, Grazer 
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should not be rewarded for his own decision to provide a low-ball bid at the Sheriffs 
Sale. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Appellees respectfully request that this Court 
affirm the trial court's ruling that the Olsen Trust's redemption attempt was effective, and 
grant such further relief as this Court finds appropriate. 
DATED this _ | ^ day of June, 2010. 
PARR BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Joseph M.R. Covey 
Michael T. Hoppe 
Attorneys for Gordon Jones and his Redemption Right 
Assignee, LudvigD. Olsen and Jackie M. Olsen, as 
trustees of the LudvigD. Olsen and Jackie M. Olsen 
Trust 
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